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ABSTRACT  
Existing case studies of control of political corruption often lack a theoretical framework that 
can provide for systematic empirical research and comparisons between cases and countries. 
To remedy this, we apply principal-agent theory qualitatively to study the United Kingdom, 
with a particular emphasis given to an in-depth study of control measures employed to 
Parliament, the Executive and political parties. We give a detailed account of the approach 
undertaken to control political corruption in these risk areas for corruption, and discuss its 
implications and why some types of measures prevail over others.  
 












Although often assumed to be lower in democratic political systems, corruption is not an 
isolated phenomenon confined to non-democratic countries, or those in which democracy 
has been recently established. On the contrary, corruption is to be found also in the most 
stable democracies in the world.  
 The UK is regarded as a country that successfully has kept corruption at low levels and 
avoided the worst forms of corruption. According to the Transparency International 
Corruption Perceptions Index 2005, the UK is perceived to be one of the least corrupt among 
159 countries included in the survey. Also more qualitative studies support the notion of the 
UK as having a good corruption record (e.g. GRECO, 2001: 3). Evaluating the National 
Integrity System (NIS)1 of the United Kingdom, Transparency International (2004: 6-16) 
concluded that the pillars of integrity are in place and that there is little corruption in the UK. 
Public sector corruption inquires are relatively rare and between 1995 and 2002 the annual 
number of cases varied between 20 (2002) and 99 (1997). However, the many sleaze2 
scandals reported in mass media the last ten years, and most recently the scandals concerning 
political financing, i.e. secret loans to political parties and donors being granted peerages, 
together with new institutional arrangements designed to control such problems, confirm that 
corruption is an important matter also in the UK (e.g. Doig, 2006; Macaulay and Lawton, 
2006). Moreover, citizens seem to be concerned with corruption in politics. The 
Transparency International Global Corruption Barometer 2005 shows that more than 31 
percent of respondents in the UK believe that corruption affects political life to a large 
                                                
1 The concept (NIS) refers to the sum of laws, institutions and practices in a country that maintain 
accountability and integrity of public, private and civil society organizations. The NIS associated with the 
institutional “pillars” that contribute to integrity and an anti-corruption system in a country in general: 
Legislature, Executive, Judiciary, Supreme Audit Institutions, Ombudsman, Independent anti-corruption 
agencies, civil service, local government, media, civil society and private sector and international institutions.   
2 Sleaze refers to a wide set of disparate areas of misconduct and wrongdoing related to public life.  
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extent, and asked about to what extent various sectors were affected by corruption most 
respondents singled out political parties in both 2004 and 2005 (Transparency International, 
2004, 2005).3  
 According to accountability theory and neo-institutionalism (e.g. Ferejohn, 1986, 
1999; Klitgaard et al., 1998; Martínez-Cousinou, 2005; Shepsle, 1989, 1995), the 
development and implementation of institutional measures to increase transparency and 
accountability of the political system and curb the likelihood of corruption are of paramount 
importance both for politicians to restore citizenship confidence and, in general terms, for 
democracy to keep or improve its health.  
 At the background of this, a key interest is therefore to investigate the response to 
political corruption in the UK4 in terms of institutional control. Our aim is to increase the 
knowledge about the approach undertaken to control risk areas of political corruption in the 
UK, where we will give particular attention to Parliament (House of Commons), the 
executive and political parties. Thus, this article addresses two questions: 1) What approach 
is taken to control political corruption in the UK? 2) What are the implications of taking this 
approach? 
 The study will (a) provide a detailed account and classification of measures to control 
political corruption in the UK, and (b) show that the various control mechanisms introduced 
in the UK have often been done so in response to scandals and that this reactive system has 
an impact on the choice of type of control measures and the composition of the control 
approach. As McCubbins and Schwartz (1984: 172) illustrated in their seminal study of 
                                                
3 Moreover, it is shown that a majority of the respondents thought that corruption had increased over the last 
three years. The balance score was +47 (those who think it has increased “a lot” or “a little” minus those who 
thought corruption had decreased “a little” or “a lot”). This figure was close to the average balance score for all 
69 countries included (+46).  
4 Although this work in principle relates to the UK, it mainly concerns England. 
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oversight in the United States Congress, motivations behind employing different types of 
safeguards and the effectiveness of these safeguards vary.   
 The UK is particularly interesting being an example of an established democracy with 
a record of low corruption, which have increasingly, during the last 10-15 years, responded 
to instances of sleaze and corruption by introducing institutional control measures. Therefore 
the development in the UK is not only interesting to study as such but also important for our 
understanding of the approaches to control political corruption in general.  
 And indeed, there are many studies of scandals and political corruption in the UK, 
measures to control political corruption, and responses to scandals (e.g. Denton, 2006; Doig, 
1996, 2003; Oliver, 1995, 1997; Williams 2002). But what we think is somewhat lacking in 
previous studies is the application of a well founded theoretical and methodological 
approach that enables the results to be followed up in further case studies or comparisons 
with other cases. This is something that this article particularly is trying to address. Thus, our 
theoretical ambitions are close to what, in terms of Eckstein’s (1975: 104-8) seminal 
classification of the use of case studies, could be described as a heuristic case study.  
  We start the article by developing our approach to systematically study institutional 
control of political corruption in the UK before turning to the control of political corruption 
in the UK. Here we outline the measures undertaken in the UK in general and in particular 
for Parliament, the executive and political parties. The final section concludes by discussing 
the approach to control political corruption in the UK and its implications. 
 
STUDYING CONTROL MEASURES OF CORRUPTION  
Our approach to study institutional control of political corruption (Table 1) is developed in 
three steps. First we discuss definitions of corruption and risk areas of corruption – danger 
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zones – and thereafter we explain why and how we use the principal-agent framework to 
study and classify control mechanisms. The next section empirically establishes Parliament, 
the executive and political parties as risk areas for corruption.  
Table 1. The study framework 
 
Ex Post Measures Danger Zones Ex Ante measures 
Police Patrol Fire Alarm 
Parliament – Commons (MPs)    
Political Parties    
Executive (ministers, civil servants, special 
advisers) 
   
 
Defining corruption and danger zones 
There are many ways of defining corruption depending on discipline and mechanisms used 
to explain corruption, and consequently the understanding of the term also varies (e.g. 
Alatas, 1990; Johnston, 1996, 2005; Philp 1997; Warren 2004). The discussion below is 
focused on developing a useful tool for studying risks and control measures.  
 We adopt as a starting point a broad definition that regards corruption as abuse of 
power for illicit gain (Alatas 1990; Heywood and Krastev, 2006: 2; Johnston, 2005: 12). 
Being a parsimonious definition, it allows for inclusion of contested practices that might not 
always be regarded as illegal, and gives enough room not to restrict corruption to private 
(individual) benefits and bribery, but also to take into account detrimental effects on the 
public interest. The problems with a strict legal definition have been pointed to by Heywood 
(1997: 423), who has argued that this could exclude one of the most threatening forms of 
corruption, the betrayal of the democratic transcript, i.e. “when members of the political 
class act in such a way as to prevent or circumvent the exercise of accountability, by actively 
seeking to ensure that the electorate is not properly informed about a given issue” (cf. 
Johnston, 2005: 5; Kjellberg, 1995: 342-3). This also points to public opinion as an 
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important element to consider (cf. Heidenheimer, 1989). Increasingly in modern 
democracies, the funding of political parties and the selling and buying of political influence 
and decisions is an important area for corruption (Heywood and Krastev, 2006: 3). We 
should not use a definition that excludes this. Furthermore, this study is restricted to political 
corruption, i.e. corruption which takes place either fully within the public sphere or at the 
interface between the public and private spheres (Heywood, 1997: 421).5  
 We will study the approach to control political corruption in the UK with an emphasis 
on Parliament, the executive and political parties, and to what extent these pillars of 
democracy are among danger zones for corruption in the UK. Thus, it is important to first 
show what areas in general are regarded as open to potential corruption in the UK. We do 
this by identifying danger zones of corruption. The concept of danger zones of corruption 
should be understood as the areas and functions of the system that are vulnerable to 
corruption: one part concerns where occurrence of corruption is likely, another part concerns 
conditions that are likely to promote corruption. In more detail, danger zones are 
characterized by such factors as many opportunities for corruption, corrupt offers being 
common, or that the important facts identified are present in such a way that corruption 
could be promoted (Andersson, 2003: 135). This implies that danger zones are not 
necessarily characterized by high levels of corruption, i.e. the concept should not be used to 
say how corrupt various areas are, rather it is more suited to identify risks.  
 In this article such danger zones, or risk areas, are identified mainly by: 1) Reports 
from Transparency International and the Committee on Standards in Public Life, which both 
play important roles concerning monitoring and awareness creation about corruption; 2) The 
                                                
5 Here including both grand (political corruption) and bureaucratic corruption, frequently referring to everyday 
interactions between citizens and public officials. 
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views of the public (a survey by Transparency International, 2005); 3) The perception of 
politicians. Nine MPs from the three major parties were interviewed 2004-2005. MPs with 
experience from Select Committees on Standards and Privileges, Constitutional Affairs, 
Public Accounts, Public Administration, Home Affairs, and Liaison were selected.6  
 This will provide a picture of risk areas in general in the UK and serve as a 
background to the particular areas we will focus our study of control measures on. 
  
The accountability framework 
Principal-agent theory is about understanding what happens when authority is delegated 
from a principal to an agent who acts for the principal under a particular set of rules, by 
which the agent can be held accountable. Several problems might occur. Principals and 
agents might have different interests or preferences; an agent might be able to behave in 
ways difficult for the principal to monitor; and/or an agent might have access to more and 
better information. Similarly, collective agents or principals, and multiple principals and 
agents, may cause difficulties (Bergman, 2000: 3; Kiewiet & McCubbins, 1991: 25-97). This 
framework deals specifically with analysing agency problems, how to overcome them and 
explaining why and when an actor chooses to resort to corrupt behavior and when she does 
not. It also provides for systematic empirical research and a base for further case studies.  
 Our starting point is that modern political systems are characterized by delegation of 
authority at all levels of government (Bergman, 2000: 3; Strøm, 2000: 267). Applied to 
parliamentary democracy in the UK, in simplified terms, authority is delegated from voters 
                                                
6 The interviewees are listed in Alphabetic order in the reference list but are coded in the text. All had the 
opportunity to revise the interview transcripts, and the revised version is the one used.  
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(principal) to Parliament (agent), from Parliament (principal) to the prime minister and the 
cabinet (agent), and from the cabinet (principal) to the public administration (agent).  
 Traditionally, political science assumed this kind of delegation almost inevitably 
meant a total loss of control for the delegating party, but contemporary research contests 
delegation as tantamount to abdication, as well as the contradictory thesis that delegation can 
be done without potential problems (e.g. Lupia, 2000; Lupia & McCubbins, 1999, 2000; see 
also Bergman and Strøm, 2004). Safeguards, i.e. control systems and information from 
external sources, can provide information independently from the agent that increase the 
costs for an agent to deliver incorrect information or act contrary to instructions, especially 
when there are efficient systems for punishment (e.g. McCubbins et al., 1987; McCubbins & 
Schwartz, 1984). Moreover, we can assume that it is in the interest of the principal to have 
good information and control systems, while it is quite likely that it is in the interest of the 
agent to try to retain as much freedom as possible and superior information about the state of 
affairs. If we, for example, think about this in terms of the relationship between voters 
(principal) and MPs (agent), it might be in the interest of the MPs to keep their freedom, be 
the provider of information about their performance, etc., and therefore try to resist 
infringements in this, for example, by more monitoring of their performance or control 
mechanism of their behavior, even though this might be in the interest of voters. But studies 
have shown that upcoming elections and scandals are factors that might contribute to 
pressures on the agent to appease with “demands” from the agent and introduce new 
accountability measures (e.g. Martinez-Cousinou, 2005).  
  These safeguards or accountability measures to overcome agency problems can be 
grouped into four main types (Kiewiet and McCubbins, 1991: 25-7): a) contract design, i.e. 
the instructions given, the training provided and the mechanisms by which new staff are 
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made aware of the principal's wishes and control mechanisms; b) screening and selection 
mechanisms, i.e. the task to recruit the “right” person; c) monitoring and reporting 
requirements, i.e. the kind of signal and control systems used, such as if there is a special 
follow-up of what the agent is doing. McCubbins and Schwartz (1984: 166) distinguish 
between two different ways for the principal to overcome problems with hidden or incorrect 
information from the agent. One is to conduct “police patrol” oversight, in the forms of audit 
and investigations and other direct monitoring, which might be costly both in economic 
terms but also in terms of actors who might feel mistrusted or constantly watched over. 
Another possibility is “fire alarm” oversight, which compared to “police patrol” oversight is 
less centralized with less active intervention, where affected third parties’, with an incentive 
to observe and influence activities of the agent, can provide information to the principal 
independently of the agent. According to McCubbins and Schwartz (1984: 171) this is both 
more effective and less costly than the direct monitoring. The principal can establish rules 
and procedures that enable citizens affected by bad actions of the agent to sound the alarm; 
d) institutional checks, i.e. the mechanisms by which counterbalancing institutions might 
veto the actions of the agent, such as requiring large expenditures to be approved by both the 
management of an activity and the comptroller. The first two types of measures, a and b, are 
ex ante mechanisms that come into play before a task has been delegated to the agent. The 
last two types, c and d, are ex post and involve measures to control after the principal and 
agent have entered into a relationship, in which the agent has received delegated authority 
(Kiewit and McCubbins, 1991: 25-33). 
 We appply this ex ante, ex post terminology in classifying and analysing the control 
aproach in the UK. But first we will give a broad overview of potential risk areas for 
corrution in the UK 
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Danger Zones in the UK 
 
Transparency International and the Committee on Standards in Public Life  
 
Transparency International (2004) expressed concerns regarding the balance between self 
regulation and compliance models of regulation; the patchwork of regulatory bodies, the 
continuing impact of New Public Management; competition and collaboration between 
different government bodies; and the relationship between government and business. 
Moreover, funding of political parties, the appointment system, and public procurement were 
areas pointed to as having problems or being more open to potential corruption.  
 Many of these findings were based on, or in line with, reports from the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life7 (1995, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003). Standards issues concerning 
MP’s, Ministers, and civil servants, and the boundaries towards the private sector, were 
central subject of the first, sixth, eight and ninth reports of the Committee. Corruption at 
local government and how to improve accountability and standards (third report), the 
funding of political parties (fifth report), and regulation and accountability of non-
departmental public bodies were other areas of concern. Next we turn to the picture provided 
by the views of the public. 
 
The Public 
A survey by Transparency International (2005) asked respondents in various countries to 
what extent they perceived different sectors in their country to be affected by corruption. In 
the UK, as in other European countries, most respondents pointed to political parties 
                                                
7 Its role and impact is elaborated further below. 
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followed by, in descending order, the Parliament, the media and the business sector, while 
the education system was regarded as the least affected sector. For our final account of 




The three risk areas that most of the interviewed MPs referred to as vulnerable or more 
exposed to corruption than others were contracts and procurement; planning; political 
financing/party funding; followed by local government in particular in relation to planning, 
development control (zoning of land), contracts and placing orders and partnerships with the 
private or voluntary sector. Among other examples pointed to were MPs (and MEPs) scope 
for small scale corruption (Interview 6, Interview 1) and the systems of appointments and the 
use of political patronage. Several interviewees emphasized the demand side of corruption 
and many of them also referred to the private sphere and the industrial corporate sector as 
more vulnerable.8 Here, public-private partnerships and privatization was also suggested as 
adding to opportunities and conflict of interest situations when civil servants move to the 
private sector (Interview 3). 
 At the same time as interviewees pointed to planning, contracts and procurement 
decisions as in extra need of vigilance, they stressed overall confidence in processes and 
measures undertaken to strengthen these in recent years. One interviewee said, 
 
                                                
8 As either a result of companies working in a multinational environment, where different norms apply in 
different parts of the world (Interview 5), or that as a result of previous corruption countervailing measures 
have been undertaken in the public sector, while the private sector is not as transparent and accountable 
(Interview 4). 
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I suppose in theory the ones who are closest to placing contracts or making decisions about planning 
matters, are the ones who are in a sense most exposed. And the further away you get from the 
decision making process the less influence you have and therefore potentially you are of less interest 
to those who want to swing things their way. In practice we have a very open system in this country 
of very transparent decision making process and the ability of any individual or elected politician to 
favor a particular party is actually quite constrained because we have a system of open tendering of 
best value, of audit of the national audit office, the public accounts committee. In the planning 
system again we have further transparent process of structure plans and district plans, appeals run by 
independent inspectors, so the potential for abuse and corruption is actually quite constrained 
(Interview 4). 
 
Examples were given of departments at the central level that were dealing with placing 
contracts, for example, the Ministry of Defense (Interview 1; Interview 4; Interview 5; 
Interview 8), which procures expensive pieces of equipment. Moreover, the Department of 
the Prime Minister and the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister9, were pointed to as they 
takes a lot of planning decisions (Interview 4). Several interviewees also referred to risks 
associated with officers working in the civil service with letting contracts and then expecting 
to find lucrative posts in the industry after leaving the civil services, and how this can 
influence decisions (Interview 5; Interview 1). But having said that, it was stressed that these 
risks were acknowledged and precautionary measures are in place, ensuring that one cannot 
immediately after leaving, for example, the Ministry of Defense go straight into an 
armaments company. 
                                                
9 Later this changed. The duties of the office were transferred to The Department for Communities and Local 
Government in 2006 in the aftermath of the scandals surrounding the Deputy Prime Minister. 
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 The funding of political parties and election campaigns and the risks of donors 
influencing parties/candidates or trying to get themselves honors were also something that 
many referred to (e.g. Interview 7). One interviewee expressed that, 
 
[T]here is also the slight concern about the influence of just not a politician but a party, which I 
think is still a concern. Because our parties do not have state funding it is open to large donors to 
have an influence on the party generally which they perhaps should not have… There is a concern 
that people are giving relatively large amounts of money to a party and they are expecting at least 
considerations of their views in return. And that is quite apart from the ridiculous honor system…I 
believe that they [members of the House of Lords] should be elected anyway. But undoubtedly 
nobody could sensibly deny that there is a casual relationship between people giving big donations 
to one or the other party and then ending up with an honor, I mean it is obvious (Interview 5). 
 
Risks with patronage were suggested in relations to non-departmental public bodies and that 
“there are literally hundreds of these and the appointments are invariably made by 
government officials or politicians and there has been a growth of this” (Interview 9).  
 When compared local government was perceived as more vulnerable to corruption than 
central government mainly due to the type of work that local governments do concerning 
procurement, contracts and planning, due to the great rewards at stake. Moreover, scrutiny 
was regarded as stronger at the national level, not least from the press and the opposition. But 
many also acknowledged that the ethical framework at the local level, consisting for example 
of a new model code of conduct, The Standards Board for England,10 and local standards 
committees, had been much strengthened over time (e.g. Interview 3, Interview 4, Interview 
5, Interview 7, Interview 9). Some interviewees even maintained that concerning small scale 
                                                
10 The task is to help to build confidence in local democracy by promoting the ethical behavior of members and 
co-opted members in local authorities through receiving complaints and investigating allegations that members 
may have breached the Code of Conduct (The Standards Board for England, 2006). 
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corruption, such as using civil servants or House of Commons’ facilities for private purposes, 
was easier for MPs (and MEPs) than local councilors, who nowadays are strictly regulated 
concerning conflict of interest matters and allowances etc. Risks regarding undue effects of 
party funding and influence from donors, and the use of patronage in appointments to enforce 
loyalty and reward those supporting the government and also donors, mainly concerned the 
central level.  
 
MEASURES TO CONTROL POLITICAL CORRUPTION IN THE UK 
Having mapped out danger zones for corruption, it is clear that it is important to study 
Parliament, the executive and political parties. But before we embark on a detailed study of 
the control approach employed in these danger zones, we first give a background to the 
development of the approach to control political corruption in the UK. 
 
Background 
In the British context, the term 'corruption' has traditionally been understood under the legal 
meaning of bribery11, but it is also used in a wider sense concerning the undermining of 
standards of conduct in public life, including the misuse of office for private benefits and 
conflicts between public and private interests. 
 Attempts to avoid the use of office for private benefits through specific acts date back 
to the 13th century. Since then various institutional mechanisms (legislation, common law 
and internal regulation) have been designed to counteract corruption (Doig, 1984). However, 
as most of them have been prompted by scandals, the final outcome of the system has not 
                                                
11 Bribery refers to a “criminal offence involving the transaction of soliciting or receiving inducements or 
rewards to local government politicians (not to MPs) and all public officials for decisions or actions that favor 
the donor or their organization” (Doig, 1996: 36). 
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been as consistent as expected. As different institutions have stated (Law Commission, 1997: 
par. 1.1), the multiplicity of sources constituting the base for the British current legislation is 
a problem. The principal corruption offences, among at least 12 statutes12, are the Public 
Bodies Corrupt Practices Act (1889), the Prevention of Corruption Act (1909) and the 
Prevention of Corruption Act (1916) – known as Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889-1916. 
In addition, there are many overlapping common law offences, such as misconduct in public 
office and attempts to bribe a councilor or a police constable (Law Commission, 1997: par. 
1.3). 
 Bar these legal means to control political corruption, other kinds of mechanisms 
concern codes of conducts, internal systems for the declaration and registration of specific 
interests in public bodies, and systems supported by independent scrutiny. Most of them 
were driven by recommendations from parliamentary and official inquiries of allegations of 
fraud or political misconduct. The most important reports are: the 1974 Redcliffe-Maud 
inquiry concerning local government rules of conduct, the 1974 Commons inquiry into MPs´ 
financial interests, and the 1976 Salmon inquiry related to the standards of conduct in public 
life – as a consequence of the Poulson scandal13 in the 1970s – and, more recently, the ten 
reports by the Committee on Standards in Public Life since 1995.14 
 However, before the 1990s these recommendations were mainly ignored due to a lack 
of interest in standards of conduct issues among MPs. Since deeper and more general 
reforms on this matter could reduce politicians’ freedom of action – which may not be in 
                                                
12 Sale of Offices Act 1551; Sale of Offices Act 1809; Public Bodies Corrupt Practices Act 1889; Prevention of 
Corruption Act 1906; Prevention of Corruption Act 1916; Honors (Prevention of Abuses) Act 1925; Licensing 
Act 1964, s 178; Criminal Law Act 1967, s 5; Local Government Act 1972, s 117(2); Local Government Act 
2000; Customs and Excise Management Act 1979, s 15; Representation of the people Act 1983, 107, 109 and 
111-115; Anti-terrorism, Crime, and Security Act 2001, Part 12. 
13 It concerned a wide network of corruption and influence-peddling at the local level, especially regarding 
planning and development, and also affected other public organizations, like Parliament. 
14 The Eleventh Report is in a preliminary phase, see http://www.public-
standards.gov.uk/11thinquiry/index.asp  
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their interest – traditionally the most common strategy followed by the British Government 
against corruption – especially in relation to MPs and ministers – was to try to determine 
individual responsibility through specific inquiries, rather than implementing 
recommendation from inquiries with general implications for politicians. But as a result of 
major public concern caused by scandals in the 1990s, this prevalent strategy was changed 
by politicians in order to restore the confidence of citizens in public officers and in the 
political system.15 With that aim, reforms recommended by institutions –like the Committee 
on Standards in Public Life, created in October 1994 – were then more adhered to by the 
Government than before, and many of them implemented (e.g. Doig, 2006). 
  The Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards and the Standards Board for England 
also publish annual reports available to the public. The Committee on Standards and 
Privileges, the Audit Commission, the National Audit Office, the Ombudsmen for 
Parliamentary and Health Service and Local Government, and the Law Commission, also 
from time to time publish reports concerning issues like fraud, bribery, conflict of interest, or 
corruption and make recommendations on the matter.  
 Some of the recommendations made by the Law Commission played an important role 
in the creation of the recent Corruption Bill (2003). The Bill, drafted by the Home Office 
(2000)16, seeks to replace the common law offence of bribery and most of the statutory 
offences contained in the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889-1916.17 However, the clarity 
and approach adopted in the Bill was comprehensively criticized by a Joint Committee of 
                                                
15 In 1993 79 percent and 81 percent respectively of citizens did not trust MPs and government ministers 
(Mortimore, 1995:586). 
16 This white paper also took into account Law Commission reports (1997, 1998), as well as the 
recommendation from the Joint Committee on Parliamentary Privilege, concerning elimination of 
parliamentary privilege in case of evidence of corruption (House of Commons, 1999; House of Lords, 1999). 
17 This change emanates from the signing of the OECD Convention on Bribery (1997), which requires a more  
comprehensive and integrated legislation.  
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both Houses appointed in 2003 (House of Commons, 2003; House of Lords, 2003). 
Although the Government (2003) accepted many of these remarks, disagreements remained 
mainly concerning the definition of corruption. Thus, so far this attempt to create a more 
consistent corruption legislation has not fully succeeded.18 
 The UK has also been active in international efforts to tackle corruption through 
participation in different institutions (the OECD’s Working Group on Bribery, the GRECO 
and the Council of Europe Criminal Law Convention on Corruption) which also give 
recommendations to member states. All in all this has resulted in a complicated system. Next 
we turn to an in-depth study of the control approach in our focused danger zones. 
 
Controlling danger zones 
Below we analyze the various measures undertaken to control corruption concerning 
Parliament – specifically MPs – political parties – especially party finance –, and the 
executive – ministers, special advisers and also civil servants. 
 
Parliament 
Some of the measures addressed had all been undertaken already in the early 19th Century; 
that is the case of the ban of payments for honors, through the 1925 Honors Act (Prevention 
of Abuses), the requirement of verbal disclosure of MPs’ financial interests or the approval 
of the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889 to 1916.19 Bar the disclosure requirement of 
                                                
18 The Home Office recently attempted to reform the Prevention of Corruption Acts and the Serious Fraud 
Office in order to tackle bribery of foreign public officials. At the moment, it is in its consultation phase, see 
http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/documents/2005-cons-bribery?version=1  
19 Although bribery of or acceptance of a bribe by MPs is not allowed, it is generally believed that such conduct 
is not a statutory offence under the Prevention of Corruption Acts 1889-1916, and there is some uncertainty on 
whether the common law offence of bribery of a person holding public office extends to MPs. That is a 
consequence of the self-regulating model in use in the House of Commons (Gay, 2002: 16). 
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financial interests which is an ex post measure of monitoring and reporting requirement type, 
all are ex ante measures contract design kind as they represent mechanisms by which new 
MPs are made aware of what they can do or not do. 
 Nevertheless, the most important measures concerning corruption of MPs were passed 
during the 1990s as a result of the “cash-for-questions” affair. This scandal, regarding 
Conservative MPs accused of accepting money in return for asking questions in the House of 
Commons, acquired major public interest and prompted the revision of standards of conduct 
in public life.  Below we look at the main institutional measures introduced that, together 
with the above mentioned mechanisms, constitute the current system to control corruption in 
the House of Commons. 
 a) The Code of Conduct. This institutional mechanism constitute an ex-ante 
safeguard, more specifically, a contract design measure as it stipulates the rules expected to 
be uphold by the MPs. It was created after recommendations made by the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life in its first report. Since June 2003, the Code of Conduct is reviewed 
in each parliament by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards. Its purpose is to assist 
Members in the discharge of their obligations to the House, their constituents and the public 
at large. Thus, the Code of Conduct applies to Members’ public roles, but not to their private 
and personal lives. In summary, it requires MPs to act in the interest of the public; 
to strengthen confidence in Parliament, not to bring the House or its Members into disrepute; 
to observe the seven principles of public life as set out in the first report of the Committee on 
Standards in Public Life; not to accept bribes or act as paid advocates.  
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 b) The Register of Members’ Interests is mainly an ex post safeguard and more 
specifically concerns monitoring and reporting requirements.20 In 1974 the House of 
Commons voted to establish a compulsory register of members’ interests and a select 
committee was appointed to administer it. In the 1990s, after the “Cash for Questions” affair, 
the Committee on Standards in Public Life (1995) recommended tightening the regulations 
on what information MPs are required to submit to the register. Since then, the Register 
contains greater detail about the type of outside service that the MPs provide and the amount 
of money they receive for this work. Specifically, MPs are required to declare in the register 
the sources of any extra income or gifts which they receive, and they must before taking part 
in a debate declare any relevant interests that might be connected to the issue debated. The 
purpose of registration is openness, that is, to give other Members and the public the 
opportunity to know about the interests which might influence a Member’s action in its 
parliamentary duties. For that reason it can be the base for improving fire alarm possibilities 
for third parties, and police patrol control by the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards.  
 The Register of Members' Interests is published soon after the beginning of a new 
Parliament under the authority of the Committee on Standards and Privileges, and annually 
thereafter. In addition, it is updated every 6-8 weeks. Together with the MPs’ Register of 
Interests, it is possible to find other registers regarding Members’ Secretaries and Research 
Assistants, All- Party Groups, Journalists’ interests and Lords’ interests. 
 c) The Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards was set up by the House of 
Commons in 1995 after recommendations by the Committee on Standards in Public Life. 
The Commissioner, who is financed by the House of Commons, is expected to act 
                                                
20 Naturally it also enables a strengthening of ex ante mechanisms in terms of affecting the selection process by 
providing information about the candidates. 
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independently. It carries out two kinds of duties. On one hand, the Commissioner plays an 
important role monitoring the performance of the system, and investigating any specific 
complaint concerning aspects of the propriety of an MPs’ conduct. In this sense, the main 
duties of the Commissioner are overseeing the fulfillment of the Register of Members’ 
Interests and other registers of interests for Members’ staff, journalists and All Party groups; 
monitoring the operation of the Code of Conduct; and investigating specific complaints from 
MPs and from members of the public in respect of the registration or declaration of interests, 
or other aspects concerning misconduct by MPs. In this respect it is mainly an ex post 
safeguard of police patrol type. But it also provides a channel for fire alarm control as it 
provides a guide for how to complain against an MP and can act on such complaints from 
the public (The Office of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards, 2006). On the 
other hand, the Commissioner act as an adviser of MPs regarding standards of conduct and 
ethics matters. The commissioner provides training and advice, and induction courses to new 
MPs, concerning conduct rules, propriety and ethics. In this respect it is an ex ante 
mechanism.  
 d) Committee on Standards and Privileges: This parliamentary select committee 
was created in 1995, replacing the Committee on Member’s Interests and the Committee on 
Privileges, after recommendations by the Committee on Standards in Public Life. It has a 
monitoring role of police patrol type but with ingredients also of fire alarm, as complaints 
from the public can be acted upon. It is also central in establishing the culture of ethical 
behavior in the House, being the embodiment of self regulation, that is, “members judging 
the propriety of other members conduct” (Committee on Standards in Public Life, 2002: 5).  
The Committee supervises the work of the Parliamentary Commissioner for Standards 
regarding the maintenance of the registers of interests and the conduct of members, 
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including specific complaints in relation to alleged breaches in the Code of Conduct which 
have been drawn to the Committee’s attention by the Commissioner. In addition, it 
recommends necessary modifications to the Code of Conduct and considers parliamentary 
privileges matters referred to it by the House.  
 
Political parties 
Political parties play an important role as intermediaries between the state, citizens and 
organizations in society. And in the competition between political parties financial resources 
are important. For that reason, the way through which they obtain funding seems to be a 
considerable cause of concern as it can represent a favorable space for corruption (Williams, 
2000). The United Kingdom is not an exception to this, as scandals over the last years have 
shown, although maybe not as big as in some other countries. 
 Traditionally, British political parties have been quite autonomous without direct 
statutory regulation of their affairs until the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 
2000 (PPERA)21 came into force. It was from the 1990s onwards – especially with the Fifth 
Report on party finance of the Committee on Standards in Public Life (1998) – when the 
urgent need for a radical reform was stressed. Until then, the party finance system has 
largely been unregulated and applied at local level.22 But concerns regarding the secrecy and 
lack of control under which political funds were accumulated and administered were not 
new. These early attempts such as recommendations made by institutions like the Committee 
                                                
21 It is possible to find other rules related to some aspects of the political parties before 2000, like the 
Registration of Political Parties Act 1998, amended by the PPERA in order to change the registration authority 
to the Electoral Commission. 
22 Until 2000, the main acts which traditionally shaped the British party finance system were the Corrupt and 
Illegal Practices (Prevention) Act 1883 (which places limits upon local campaign spending, but not at national 
level) and the Representation of the People Act 1983, which modified the latter (Fisher, 2000:25). The PPERA 
for the first time established a regulatory framework for party finance at national level. 
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on Financial Aid to Political Parties (1976) and the Hansard Society for Parliamentary 
Government (1981, 1992), were almost all rejected.   
 Thus, the current British party finance system is essentially constituted by measures 
passed in the PPERA and  by previous acts partially related to party finance, like the Corrupt 
and Illegal Practices (Prevention) Act 1883 and the Representation of the People Act 1983. 
Within this system, the main institutional measures23 that contribute to control corruption in 
this danger zone are:  
 a) Registers related to the control of donations and campaign expenditure. Under 
the PPERA, registered political parties, third parties and permitted participants in elections 
and referendum are obliged to report their income and expenditure to the Electoral 
Commission. Thus, these registers put reporting requirements on the agent concerning how 
money is attracted and used, they are mainly an ex post safeguard that can be the base for 
either improved fire alarm or a police patrol control. The main registers are the following: 
the register of donations to political parties; the register of campaign expenditure by political 
parties, the register of donations to third parties; the register of controlled expenditure by 
third parties; the register of donations to permitted participants; the register of referendum 
expenses by permitted participants; and the register of donations to regulated donors. 
 b) The Electoral Commission is an independent body responsible directly to 
Parliament. It oversees the PPERA and collect financial information. Its main duties 
regarding party finance includes maintaining and monitoring a series of registers (the 
register of political parties, the register of donations of political parties, the register of 
                                                
23 In May 2006, the Electoral Commission published a Code of conduct on reporting loans for political parties 
and accounting units. Although the reporting of loans is not required under the PPERA 2000, the Commission 
is urging parties to report details of all loans, on the same basis of donations. As it is a voluntary code intended 
to ensure greater transparency in party funding pending a change in the law on the reporting of loans, we are 
not considering it in this article.  
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campaign expenditure, and the register of donations by donors, amongst others); monitoring 
the people who are regulated by PPERA to make sure they work properly; and publishing 
reports on election-campaign spending, donations to political parties, and political parties’ 
annual accounts.24 In this respect it represents an ex post measure of mainly a police patrol 
type. Other functions include reviewing electoral law and practice, managing referendums, 





Standards of conduct  of  Ministers have been addressed by the Committee on Standards in 
Public Life on three separate occasions: first in 1995, when it made recommendations on the 
approval of the Ministerial Code and the extension of the Business Appointment Rules to 
ministers and special advisers; second in 2000, when the Committee reviewed those 
arrangements; and finally in 2003, considering again issues concerning the role and 
functions of the Executive’s members in the light of a series of highly publicized cases 
involving  ministers, special advisers and civil servants. The main safeguards concerning 
ministers are:  
 a) The Ministerial Code. This institutional mechanism mainly constitutes an ex-ante 
measure of contract design type. It was predeceased by Questions of Procedures for 
Ministers in 1992, and revised and reissued as the Ministerial Code in 1997 after 
recommendations by the Committee on Standards in Public Life in its first and sixth reports. 
                                                
24 The Electoral Commission is currently reviewing the Political Parties, Elections and Referendums Act 2000 
and is expected published the report in December 2006. This review considers whether the Electoral 
Commission has the right powers to regulate political parties and candidate finances, and whether the penalties 
and criminal sanctions available are appropriate.   
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Since then it has been reviewed twice. The latest version of the Code was issued in July 
2005 and for the fist time it is split into two parts: a ministerial code of ethics – which sets 
out the standards of ministerial behavior concerning appointments; private interests,  
introducing an element of ex post control of police patrol type as ministers are advised to 
report all their interest, though not in public registers;25 and the relationship between 
ministers and civil servants – and a procedural guidance for ministers – which covers topics 
such as Cabinet and ministerial business, and legal proceedings involving ministers. 
Furthermore, there are similar separate codes for the devolved administrations in Scotland 
and Wales.  
 b) The Adviser on Ministerial Interests was appointed for the first time in March 
2006 by the prime Minister, after the controversy surrounding the Culture Secretary, and the 
business dealings of her husband.26 Although the Prime Minister is the ultimate judge of the 
standards of behavior expected of a Minister and the appropriate consequences of a breach 
of those standards, the Adviser on Ministerial Interests plays an important role by giving 
advice to Ministers on potential conflict of interest arising under the Ministerial Code, and 
by investigating the facts in any allegations concerning a breach of it. Thus, it represents an 
ex post safeguard, specifically, a police patrol one. Before it was created, and following the 
Ministerial Code, the advising role concerning conflict of interests of Ministers was carried 
                                                
25 The Ministerial Code states that: “On appointment to each new office, Ministers are advised to provide their 
Permanent Secretary with a full list in writing of all interests which might be thought to give rise to a conflict. 
(…). The list should cover all kinds of interest including financial instruments and partnerships, financial 
interest such as unincorporated businesses and real state, as well as relevant non-financial private interest such 
as links with outside organizations, and previous relevant employment” (par. 5.3). Moreover, Ministers “(…) 
should declare (…) [their] interest to Ministerial colleagues if they have to discuss public business which in any 
way affects it (…)” (par. 5.5).   
26 The Committee on Standards in Public Life have for a long time argued for the need of an independent 
institution dealing with these issues. In its Ninth Report the Committee suggested that Permanent Secretaries 
and the Cabinet Secretary should have no responsibility for giving such advice to Ministers, and recommended 
the appointment of an independent Adviser on Ministerial Interests to advise incoming ministers and record 
ministerial interests. Although the Government (2003) accepted the principle of an independent adviser in, no 
appointment was made until the scandal happened. 
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out by the Permanent Secretaries and the Cabinet Secretary.27 The introduction of an adviser 
expected to carry out these functions independently require changes of the Code regarding 
those issues.  
 c) The Commissioner for Public Appointments was established in 1995 on the 
recommendation of the Committee on Standards in Public Life. It is an independent 
institution that constitutes an ex post safeguard of police patrol type, whose main role is to 
regulate, monitor and report on ministerial appointments to a closed list of public bodies: 
health bodies, non-departmental public bodies, public corporations, nationalized industries 
and the appointments of the Utility Regulators. Both Scotland and Northern Ireland each 
have their separate commissioners.   
 d) The Code of practice for ministerial appointments to public bodies. The 
Commissioner for Public Appointments set up this ex ante safeguard of contract design type.  
The aim is to provide departments with a clear and concise guide to the steps they must 
follow in order to ensure a fair, open and transparent appointments process that produces a 
quality outcome and can command public confidence.28 
Civil servants and special advisers 
Several safeguards apply to civil servants and there are also some that apply to special 
political advisers, which is a group that have not been covered by rules to the same extent as 
civil servants, something which has been the issue of much debate since they have increased 
both in importance and in numbers in government over time.  
                                                
27 The Ministerial Code states, “the role of the Permanent Secretary is to ensure that advice is available when it 
is sought by the Minister, either by providing it personally (…), or to arrange for expert or professional advice 
from inside or outside Government” (Cabinet Office, 2005: par. 5.2). 
28 Together with that Code of Practice, the Public Appointments Unit in the Cabinet Office produced a 
document entitled “Making Public Appointments – A Best Practice Guide for Departments” in association with 
the Commissioner for Public Appointments. Departments are encouraged to refer to it in conjunction with the 
Code of Practice. 
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 a) Code of conduct for special advisers. It was first published in 2001 by the Cabinet 
Office upon recommendations of the Committee on Standards in Public life. After its latest 
revision, issued in July 2005, the Code includes different issues concerning the conduct of 
special advisers, as well as what kind of work they can do. It represents an ex ante safeguard 
of contract design type. 
 b) Model of contract for Special advisers. This institutional mechanism represents an 
ex ante safeguard of contract design, as it stipulates terms and conditions of employment for 
special advisers. It was set up in 1997 by the Government with the aim of setting out the 
duties and responsibilities of special advisers, including the application of the business 
appointment rules. A revised model was issued in 2001. 
 c) The Civil service code. It  represents an ex ante measure, specifically contract 
design, as it sets out the framework within which all civil servants work, and the core values 
and standards they are expected to uphold. It forms part of the Civil Service Management 
Code, which sets out the central framework for management of the Civil Service. It was first 
introduced in 1996 and a new revised version was issued on 6 June 2006. 
 d) The Civil Service Commissioners. They have a duty to audit recruitment by 
departments and agencies to ensure compliance with the principle of selection on merit, fair 
and open competition, and to advice departments on their promotion of the Civil service 
code. This is an ex post mechanisms of mainly police patrol type, but as investigations of 
complaints and appeals received from civil servants under the Civil Service Code and the 






In this article, we set out to study the approach taken to control political corruption in the 
UK. We applied a principal-agent framework qualitatively to analyze the institutional 
mechanisms employed to counteract corruption in terms of ex ante mechanisms, mainly 
contract design measures, and ex post mechanisms, mainly reporting and monitoring 
requirements, and also whether monitoring was of “police patrol” type, i.e. direct by 
appointed bodies, or of “fire alarm” type, i.e. providing channels for reports and independent 
information from third parties. Our study was particularly focused on Parliament, the 
executive and political parties, which were selected not only because them being important 
pillars of democracy but also after having established them as among danger zones for 
corruption in the UK.  
 The analysis suggests that the control system has developed a lot in the UK over the 
last 10-15 years. A plethora of institutional mechanisms have been introduced with wide 
coverage both in terms of areas covered and their aspects of control. In table 2 we 
summarize what type of ex ante or ex post measure they mainly are. In general, the system 
combines ex ante and ex post mechanism, implying a focus not just on ex post mechanisms 
in terms of reporting and monitoring mechanism but also on ex ante measures of contract 
design type, by focusing on preventive measures such as codes of conduct, information, 
induction courses and advice. Ex ante measures of contract design type are well developed, 
indicating a strive to create a culture not admissible to corruption, instead of only being 
preoccupied with a focus on punitive measures.  
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Table 2. Controlling political corruption – The UK approach 
Ex Post Measures Danger zones 
 
Ex Ante measures 
















   Electoral Commission 
 
 Registers of donations 
and expenditure 
Ministers  Ministerial Code 
 Code of Practice 
for Ministerial  
Appointments 
 Ministerial Code* 
 The Adviser on 
Ministerial Interests 




















 Code of Conduct  
 Model of Contract 
  
* Referring to ministers being advised to report all their interest.  
 
 Moreover, many of the reporting and monitoring safeguards recently introduced, are 
not done so only in combination with supervisions from “police patrol” bodies that 
undertake auditing and policing functions of these reporting requirements. They also provide 
explicit channels for third parties/citizens to use for complaints and reporting of 
irregularities, such as complaint procedures against MPs, which improve the possibilities 
and effectiveness of “fire alarm” actions. The increasing role given to “fire alarm” measures, 
which to some extent goes hand in hand with a general trend, i.e. the Freedom of 
Information Act 2002, with an increasing focus on and provision of channels and mechanism 
for third parties to provide independent information and reporting complaints and 
irregularities, will make the system more effective. It is inherently difficult to create 
reporting requirements, ruling out that agents may report in a way that is favorable to 
themselves or simply provide false information. And police patrol safeguards might not be 
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very effective as such bodies can only take sample tests, and if a constant supervision is 
applied this would be both costly and the monitored subjects might feel mistrusted. The 
advantage of “fire alarm” is that it is not restricted in scope, as it can use information from 
third parties affected by actions of the agent, by providing mechanisms for them to use, and 
it also requires less resources than police patrol mechanisms.  
 Concerning the mix of police patrol and fire alarm measures McCubbins and Schwartz 
(1984: 172) stated that,   
 
[a]s most organizations grow and mature, their top policy makers adopt methods of control that are 
comparatively decentralized and incentive based [fire alarm]. Such methods, we believe, will work 
more efficiently (relative to accepted policy goals) than direct, centralized surveillance [police 
patrol measures]. 
 
We have shown that in the areas of Parliament, the executive and political parties, the scope 
of fire alarm measures have increased, but one should note that this is often in combination 
with measures which predominantly is police patrol based (see Table 2). Moreover, the 
driving force may not be a coordinated planned search for more effective controls. A recent 
example concerns the Adviser on Ministerial Interests, which was created as a result of the 
scandal surrounding a cabinet member, but the Committee on Standards in Public Life had 
been asking for its creation for long time, without any action on behalf of the Government. 
Having said that, the institutionalization of bodies such as the Committee on Standards in 
Public Life has provided pressure to undertake coherent preventive measures before scandals 
happen, although the pressure for implementation increase as a result of scandals. 
 Overall this study points to that the system that has evolved seems to strike a rather 
good balance between ex ante and ex post measures and that a substantial development of 
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improvement of police patrol measures have complemented the police patrol dominated 
reporting and monitoring requirements introduced. But to be able to judge how this system 
overall is balanced between various accountability measures and its effectiveness, studies of 
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